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Versión: septiembre 2015 / Version: September 2015
Edita / Published by:
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A.
C/ Guardia Civil, 22 esc. 2 1º - 46020 Valencia (Spain)

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12842/WPASAD-2015-08
Relative Injustice Aversion*

Luis Moreno-Garrido**

Abstract

I propose a new utility function based on the relative aversion to injustice to explain why, in bargaining games, neither classical equilibria nor inequality aversion equilibria hold when money is not windfall, but it is the result of the effort. This utility function generalizes the concept of inequality aversion when agents have beliefs about what they deserve, and it is able to explain rejections in non zero-sum games. I analyze the agents' behavior and their bargaining power in the dictator game, ultimatum game and (0,1)-ultimatum game and results are compared within those games.

Keywords: Injustice Aversion, Distribution, Property Rights, Bargaining power.

JEL classification numbers: D3, D63, D64, P14.

* I am indebted to Coralio Ballester-Pla for his support and help. I also would like to thank Giovanni Ponti, Alfonso Rosa-García, Hubert János Kiss, Ismael Rodríguez-Lara, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Adam Sanjurjo, Marcello Sartarelli and José Alcalde for his careful revision and comments. This work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, under project ECO2013-43119-P.

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1 Introduction

The behavior that individuals exhibit in lab experiments might differ from the one anticipated by theoretical approaches. This is particularly shown for the case of bargaining games. In this matter, there is evidence showing that the mean donation by participants in the dictator game in the lab is about 20% of the endowment, in contrast with the 0% expected by the classical rational model (see Camerer [2003] and Engel [2011], for a review). This result seems to be robust in some circumstances. For instance, when the size of the pie is doubled (Forsythe et al. [1994]), when dictator’s decision is anonymous, even for experimenters (Hoffman et al. [1994]) or even when subjects come from different cultures (Henrich et al. [2001]).

A potential explanation for lab results in bargaining frameworks is that agents’ preferences also depend on other factors, not just on their own award. Alternative modelizations proposed in the literature include, for instance, the concept of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt [1999], hereafter FS). Other explanations for this deviation from theoretical prediction are social pressure, guilt and sympathy (Andreoni [1990]), confusion (Andreoni [1995]), cooperation (Fehr and Gachter [2000]), altruism (Fehr and Gachter [2002]) and Andreoni and Miller [2002]), reputation (Milinski et al. [2002] and Nowak et al. [2000]) and so on. The sense of fairness seems to be common in the whole mankind (Henrich et al. [2001]). However, the “size” of this fairness varies among cultures (Henrich [2000]). Altruistic preferences have been studied from a biological point of view. Brañas-Garza et al. [2013] find that the exposure to prenatal sex hormones affects altruism. Although genes affect altruistic behavior and risk aversion, genetic differences only explain approximately twenty percent of individual variation Cesarini et al. [2009].

It has been shown that the percentage given by dictators is context dependent, especially when money is not manna for heaven, but it is the result of an agent’s effort and agents have believes about what everyone deserves. In this line, Cherry et al. [2002], show that when the size of the pie is determined by dictators’ effort, under anonymous conditions, 95% of dictators give nothing. However, when the size of the pie is determined by recipients’ effort, dictators will be willing to give them away a greater percentage of money (Ruffle [1998] and Oxoby and Spraggon [2008]). The idea of deserving is also introduced in experimental studies such as Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Kurkiet (Frohlich et al. [2004], hereafter FOK), Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [2012a] and Birkeland and Bertil [2014]. Current behavior models are not able to explain rejections in bargaining games with non-zero sum. The inequality aversion model of FS punishes deviations from fifty percent of the pie. However, when money is the result of an effort, agents could believe

1Eckel and Grossman [1996] claim that even with anonymous conditions, dictator may increase her offer when she knows the characteristics of the recipient (for instance, when recipient is an established charity, offer triples with respect to a recipient from the same population as dictator).

2Andreoni distinguishes between kindness and confusion. He claims that half of collaborations in an experiment came from people who understood the free-riding opportunity, but chose to cooperate.

3Technically, the dictator game is a constant sum game. However, without loss of generality, the payoff can be normalized, and it can be supposed that dictator game is a zero-sum game. Ultimatum game is not a zero-sum game because the sum of payoff is different, depending on whether responder accepts or rejects the offer.
that what they deserve is different than the half of the pie. Extensions of FS model are proposed by FOK and Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [2012b], but those models allow contradictory feelings such as envy and guilty simultaneously. This paper proposes a new theoretical model for bargaining games with production that incorporates relative injustice aversion. In this model, an agent suffers from disutility, when the injustice committed against her (defined as the difference between what she thinks she deserves and the material payoff) is different of the injustice committed against her counterpart.\(^4\) Theoretical predictions of several bargaining games are computed as a function of the parameters of the model.\(^5\)

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review two classical bargaining games and modifications of them. The theoretical model is presented in section 3 and in section 4 theoretical equilibria of presented bargaining games are computed. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2 Bargaining Games

In this section, I review two classical bargaining games and modifications of them: dictator game, ultimatum game, \(\delta\)-ultimatum game, \((\delta_1, \delta_2)\)-ultimatum game and \((0, 1)\)-ultimatum game.

The ultimatum game (Güth et al. [1982]) is a two-player game, where one of the players, called proposer, has to decide how to split a certain amount \(M\) between herself and the second player, called responder. Suppose that proposer offers \(x\) to responder, then the initial allocation is \((M - x, x)\). If responder accepts the offer, then it is carried out. However, if responder rejects the offer, then both players obtain nothing. Dictator game is a particular case of ultimatum game, where responder is forced to accept. In this game, the Nash equilibrium for the dictator, is to keep the whole pie. In the ultimatum game, in a continuous strategic space, the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is that profile in which proposer offers nothing and recipient accepts any non-negative offer.\(^6\)

The classical example of the ultimatum game is a bargaining between a seller and a buyer that have to decide how to split the surplus of a traded good.\(^7\)

The \(\delta\)-ultimatum game is a modified ultimatum game introduced by Suleiman [1996]. It falls between the dictator game and the ultimatum game. In this game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer has to decide how to split a certain amount \(M\) between herself and responder. If responder accepts the offer of \(x\), then, the payoffs are also \((M - x, x)\). On the other hand, if responder rejects the offer, then payoffs are multiplied by \(\delta\), and they

\(^4\)What an agent thinks she deserves is a single subjective point. In this way, contradictory feelings are avoided.

\(^5\)In future research, theoretical results will be contrasted with experimental.

\(^6\)In a discrete strategic space, if the minimum monetary unit is a token, then there are two Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium; the former one and another one where proposer offers one token and responder accept any non-zero offer.

\(^7\)It is understood as surplus the difference between the reservation price of the seller (the minimum price seller willing to sell) and the reservation price of the buyer (the maximum price buyer is willing to pay). Without loss of generality, it can be supposed that reservation price of the seller is zero and reserved price of the buyer is \(M\), and therefore the surplus is \(M\).
are \((\delta (M - x), \delta x)\). Note that when \(\delta = 0\), then the game matches the ultimatum game and when \(\delta = 1\), rejection does not play any role and then, the game matches the dictator game. Since dictator and ultimatum game have the same theoretical prediction, then the \(\delta\)-ultimatum game should have the same prediction as well. However, as Suleiman [1996] proved, proposer’s offer increases when \(\delta\) decreases, and therefore proposer is more afraid of a possible rejection, when the cost of it (proportional to \(1 - \delta\)) increases.

Another bargaining game proposed by Suleiman is the \((\delta_1, \delta_2)\)-ultimatum game.\(^8\) The unique difference from \(\delta\)-ultimatum game is that in case of rejection payoffs are \((\delta_1 (M - x), \delta_2 x)\). That is, proposer’s payoff is multiplied by \(\delta_1\) and responder’s payoff is multiplied by \(\delta_2\).\(^9\) Finally, I propose the \((0, 1)\)-ultimatum game (hereafter \((0, 1)\)UG) as particular case of the \((\delta_1, \delta_2)\)-ultimatum game, where \(\delta_1 = 0\) and \(\delta_2 = 1\). In this game, in case of rejection, proposer obtains nothing and responder keeps the initial proposal.\(^10\) Table 1 summarizes the payoffs of those bargaining games.

Since rejections in \((0, 1)\)UG does not affect responder’s payoff, the only reason that could motivate a rejection in this bargaining game are psychological emotions such as inequality aversion or injustice aversion. This game could be understood as a kind of trust game. Proposer has to put her trust in responder, and wait an acceptance if the offer is fair. An example of \((0, 1)\)UG could be the same bargaining game proposed in dictator game, with the proviso that buyer, after the trading is asked to fill out a survey and in case of negative report, the buyer loses her profit.

In the \((0, 1)\)UG, the SPNE is such that proposer offers the minimum amount that responder is willing to accept and responder only accepts any offer better or equal to her minimum accepted offer.\(^11\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game</th>
<th>Acceptance</th>
<th>Rejection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dictator Game</td>
<td>((M - x, x))</td>
<td>((M - x, x))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimatum Game</td>
<td>((M - x, x))</td>
<td>((0, 0))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\delta)-Ultimatum Game</td>
<td>((M - x, x))</td>
<td>((\delta (M - x), \delta x))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((\delta_1, \delta_2))-Ultimatum Game</td>
<td>((M - x, x))</td>
<td>((\delta_1 (M - x), \delta_2 x))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((0, 1))UG</td>
<td>((M - x, x))</td>
<td>((0, x))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Payoffs for an acceptance or rejection of an initial allocation \((M - x, x)\).

\(^{8}\)Ochs and Roth [1989] introduce a sequential ultimatum game, where 2 players alternately offer to each other a division. In case of rejection, roles are reversed and payoffs are multiplied by \((\delta_1, \delta_2)\). The \((\delta_1, \delta_2)\)-ultimatum game is a particular case where there is only one period.

\(^{9}\)Note that dictator game and ultimatum game are also particular cases of the \((\delta_1, \delta_2)\)-ultimatum game. When \(\delta_1 = \delta_2 = 1\), it is the dictator game and when \(\delta_1 = \delta_2 = 0\), it is the ultimatum game.

\(^{10}\)Fellner and Guth [2003] measure the threat power in the \((\lambda, 1 - \lambda)\)-ultimatum game. The \((0, 1)\)UG is also a particular case of this game with \(\lambda = 0\).

\(^{11}\)Note that if the minimum accepted offer is the whole pie, then proposer’s payoff is zero regardless of her offer and she has no any profitable deviation from offering something different to the minimum accepted offer.
3 Theoretical model

Material utility function (also known as selfish utility function) only depends on monetary payoffs. However, some authors, as Rabin (1993), Fehr and Smith (1999) or Konow (2000) introduce psychological payoffs in the utility function. Let us define formally those utility functions.

**Definition 1** (Selfish utility function). Let \((S, P)\) a game with 2 players, where \(S = S_1 \times S_2\) is the strategy space and \(P = (p_1, p_2)\) are the material payoff function where \(p_i(s_1, s_2)\) depends on the strategy \((s_1, s_2) \in S_1 \times S_2\).

If the utility function of player \(i\) can be represented by an increasing function \(f\) of the payoffs \(p_i(s_i, s_j)\)

\[
u_i(s_i, s_j) = f(p_i(s_i, s_j)) \quad \forall s_i \in S_i \quad \forall s_j \in S_j, \quad i, j \in \{1, 2\}, i \neq j
\]

then we say that the utility function \(u_i\) is selfish.

Note that the partial derivative of the utility function \(u_i\) with respect to the own payoff \(p_i(s_i, s_j)\) is greater than zero. However, the partial derivative of the utility function \(u_i\) with respect to the another player’s payoff \(p_j(s_i, s_j)\) is always zero. That is

\[
\frac{\partial u_i}{\partial p_i} \geq 0 \quad \forall p_i \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial p_j} = 0 \quad \forall p_j. \quad (1)
\]

When the second condition is not satisfied, we say that the utility function is subjective.

**Definition 2** (Subjective utility function). We say that the utility function \(u_i\) is subjective if

\[
\frac{\partial u_i}{\partial p_j} \neq 0.
\]

Factors that make \(\frac{\partial u_i}{\partial p_j} \neq 0\) could be psychological payoffs such as beliefs (Rabin [1993]), fairness (Konow [2000]), or envy or guilty (FS). FS introduced one of the pioneer subjective utility functions with the concept of inequality aversion. The FS utility function not only depends on the own payoff, but also on the differences of payoffs. For agent \(i\), her utility function is defined as

\[
u_i(s_i, s_j) = p_i(s_i, s_j) - \alpha_i \max \{p_j(s_i, s_j) - p_i(s_i, s_j), 0\} - \beta_i \max \{p_i(s_i, s_j) - p_j(s_i, s_j), 0\}, \quad (1)
\]

where the term associated to \(\alpha_i\) depicts the disadvantageous inequality aversion, i.e., the loss of utility that agent \(i\) has if agent \(j\) has a greater monetary payoff. This model also

\[
\frac{\partial u_i}{\partial p_j} = -\frac{\partial u_i}{\partial p_j}, \quad \text{for this reason, } p_i \quad \text{and} \quad p_j \quad \text{are considered independent for this definition.}
\]
assumes that agent $i$ suffers from disutility if agent $j$ has a relative smaller monetary payoff. The term associated to $\beta_i$ captures this advantageous inequality aversion. FS suppose that $\alpha \geq \beta \geq 0$.\footnote{Some agents may like inequality (i.e., for whom $\beta < 0$). In competitive games, $\beta < 0$ yields the same prediction that $\beta = 0$. Hereafter, I suppose that $\beta \geq 0$.} Hence, agents dislike inequality, but they dislike more the disadvantageous inequality (envy) that the advantageous one (guilt).

Now, I analyze the dictator and the ultimatum game in the FS framework. Let $M$ be the initial amount to split in the dictator game. When dictator offers $x$ to recipient, material payoffs are $p_1(x, s_2) = M - x$ and $p_2(x, s_2) = x$. The solution for the linear model (1) is $x = 0$ if $\beta_1 < 1/2$ and $x = M/2$ if $\beta_1 > 1/2$.\footnote{With a non-linear model, interior solutions in the interval $[0, M/2]$ are reached.} In other words, if the advantageous inequality aversion parameter ($\beta_1$) is large enough, then dictator prefers to share the half of the pie in order to avoid guilt associated to an unequal distribution.

In the ultimatum game, proposer not only considers the parameter $\beta_1$, but also the parameter $\alpha_2$, because an unfair offer may cause a rejection of responder. Since offers above $M/2$ are dominated by $x = M/2$, proposer should offer $x \in [0, M/2]$, and responder will accept, if the utility to accept the offer $x$, $u^2_2(x)$, is greater than or equal to the utility to reject $x$, $u^r_2(x)$,

$$u^a_2(x) = x - \alpha_2 (M - 2x) \geq u^r_2(x) = 0.$$ \footnote{In case of indifference, it is assumed that responder accepts because otherwise, there would not be equilibrium in a continuous strategy space.}

If $x \geq \frac{\alpha_2}{2\alpha_2+1} M$, then responder will accept the offer.\footnote{For an extension of this model and discussion of justice principles see Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012b).} However, if the proportion shared is smaller than $\frac{\alpha_2}{2\alpha_2+1}$, then responder will prefer to reject the offer in order to reduce the disadvantageous inequality aversion. Figure 1B represents the responder’s utility when parameters $\alpha_2$ and $\beta_2$ change.

In the FS model, both agents believe that the fair allocation is the half of the pie for each one. However, in bargaining games with production, agents could think that what they deserve is not the equal split, but their contribution to it ($C_i$). In this line, FOK proposes the utility function\footnote{In equation (2), the term associated to $\gamma_i$ represents a disadvantageous injustice aversion that agent suffers when she receives less than her contribution. In the same way, the term associated to $\psi_i$ represents advantageous injustice aversion. This concept of injustice aversion is a generalization of FS model, when the game is a zero-sum game. In FS, an agent suffers from inequality when payoff moves away from the equal division and in the}
injustice aversion model, an agent suffers from injustice when payoff moves away from what she believes she deserves.

This utility function can explain offers over equal division when the contribution of recipient is greater than the contribution of proposer. However, when $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_i$ are zero (or very low), FOK utility function is not able to explain a rejection in the ultimatum game. Suppose that proposer offers $x_1 < C_2$, then, if $\alpha_2 = \beta_2 = 0$ is assumed, then responder’s utility for an acceptance

$$u_2^a (x) = x_1 - \gamma_2 (C_2 - x_1) = (1 + \gamma_2) x_1 - \gamma_2 C_2,$$

and for a rejection

$$u_2^r (x_1) = -\gamma_2 C_2,$$

and therefore, responder will always accept, thus this concept of injustice aversion does not explain rejections in the ultimatum game, because a rejection (both players obtain nothing) eliminates the inequality aversion in FS, but it does not eliminate the injustice aversion.

I wish to define a utility function that keeps the essence of injustice aversion, where a \textit{deserving point} is defined, but it does not fail in non zero-sum games. I define the relative injustice aversion, that considers the difference between the injustice committed against, or for, both agents.

Figure 1: Proposer’s (A) and responder’s (B) utility in the ultimatum game when responder receives $x$ and the proposer keeps $M - x$. Null payoff stands for a rejection. ($\alpha_2 = \beta_2 = 0$) represents the classical model.
Definition 3. The utility function with relative injustice aversion is

\[ u_i = \left( x_i, x_j \right) = \begin{pmatrix} x_i, x_j \end{pmatrix} 

- \lambda_i \max \left\{ (D_{ii} - p_i(x_i, x_j)) - (D_{ij} - p_j(x_i, x_j)), 0 \right\} 

- \mu_i \max \left\{ (D_{ij} - p_j(x_i, x_j)) - (D_{ii} - p_i(x_i, x_j)), 0 \right\}, \]

where \( D_{ij} \) stands for what agent \( i \) thinks that agent \( j \) deserves.

The term \( D_{ij} - p_j(x_i, x_j) \) is the injustice that agent \( i \) thinks that is committed against agent \( j \). The term

\[ -\lambda_i \max \left\{ (D_{ii} - p_i(x_i, x_j)) - (D_{ij} - p_j(x_i, x_j)), 0 \right\} \]

represents the disutility of being treated relatively worse than her counterpart (disadvantageous relative injustice aversion) and the term

\[ -\mu_i \max \left\{ (D_{ij} - p_j(x_i, x_j)) - (D_{ii} - p_i(x_i, x_j)), 0 \right\} \]

stands for the disutility of being treated relatively better than her counterpart (advantageous relative injustice aversion). As in FS, I also suppose that the advantageous relative injustice is less damaging than the disadvantageous relative injustice, i.e., \( \mu_i \leq \lambda_i \). Note that if agent \( i \) suffers from disadvantageous relative injustice aversion, then agent \( j \) suffers from advantageous relative injustice aversion in the same proportion. It is also supposed that parameters are bounded below; \( \lambda_i > 0 \) and \( \mu_i \geq 0 \).

Since it is supposed that agent \( i \) is rational, then the sum of what she thinks she deserves \( (D_{ii}) \) and what she thinks that her counterpart deserves \( (D_{ij}) \) must sum the total amount, i.e., \( D_{ii} + D_{ij} = M \). Thus, the utility function can be rewritten with relative injustice aversion as

\[ u_i (x_i, x_j) = p_i (x_i, x_j) 

- \lambda_i \max \left\{ 2D_{ii} - M + p_j(x_i, x_j) - p_i(x_i, x_j), 0 \right\} 

- \mu_i \max \left\{ M - 2D_{ii} + p_i(x_i, x_j) - p_j(x_i, x_j), 0 \right\}. \]

Note that if \( D_{ii} = M/2 \) (egalitarian principle) then the utility function matches up with inequality aversion utility function, making \( \lambda_i = 2\alpha_i \) and \( \mu_i = 2\beta_i \). FS use the half of the pie \( (M/2) \) as focal point, whereas, I consider this focal point \( D_{ii} \) as a free parameter. In this way, it can take different values according to beliefs about property rights derived from production. For this reason, relative injustice aversion utility function generalizes the inequality aversion function of FS.

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17When \( i = j \), \( D_{ii} - p_i(x_i, x_j) \) is simply the injustice that agent \( i \) thinks is committed against herself. Note that it can be positive (advantageous) or negative (disadvantageous).

18If \( \lambda_i = 0 \), then \( \mu_i = 0 \), and therefore we have the classical selfish utility function. The parameter \( \mu_i \), that represents the advantageous relative injustice aversion, could be had bounded above by 1 \( \mu_i < 1 \), using a similar argument that FS use for the bounding for \( \beta_i \) in their model, but it is not necessary for the aim of this study.

19Beliefs about \( D_{ii} \) usually follow some justice principles. For a wider discussion review Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [2012a].
However, with this utility function, it is not possible to capture all the feelings that FOK utility function does. The latter allows contradictory feelings such as envy and guilty simultaneously. However, our utility function does not allow several focal points. Suppose, for instance, the case that

\[ p_j (x_i, x_j) > p_i (x_i, x_j) > C_i, \]

that is, agent \( i \) has a smaller payoff than her counterpart, but her payoff is greater than her contribution, thus in FOK model (equation 2), she suffers from two-fold disutility. On the one hand, she suffers from disadvantageous inequality aversion (\( \alpha_i \)), because she obtains less than the half of the pie, and on the other, she suffers from advantageous injustice aversion (\( \psi_i \)), because she obtains more than her contribution. Those disutility terms have both negative sign and hence they reduce the utility. However, with the relative injustice aversion utility function, agents either feel envy or feel guilty, that is, agents cannot have both feelings simultaneously.\(^{20}\)

4 Theoretical equilibria

In this section, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is computed for each of the bargaining games presented above, using the relative injustice aversion utility function (3). I analyze the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the \((0,1)\)-ultimatum game. Details are available in section 6 in the Appendix.\(^{21}\)

4.1 Dictator Game

The strategic space of the dictator is \( S_1 = [0, M] \). Classical model predicts that dictator should keep the whole pie. However, FS show that inequality aversion yields positive allocations to responders. The aim of this section is to explain how, the relative injustice aversion predicts that some dictators will pass some positive amount of money away.

If the dictator (player 1) offers \( x_1 \) to recipient (player 2), their monetary payoffs are \( p_1 (x_1, x_2) = M - x_1 \) and \( p_2 (x_1, x_2) = x_1 \), respectively. Using the fact that \( D_{12} = M - D_{11} \), equation (3) can be represented as

\[
    u_1 (x_1) = M - x_1 - 2 \lambda_1 \max \{ x_1 - D_{12}, 0 \} - 2 \mu_1 \max \{ D_{12} - x_1, 0 \}.
\]

Since

\[
    u_1 (D_{12}) = M - x_1 = D_{11},
\]

\(^{20}\)Since justice is relative, in the relative injustice aversion model, it would be possible to define different justice points. However, since Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [2012a] claim that justice is not genuine but context dependent, it is enough to define a single justice point that could change with the framework.\(^{21}\)The equilibrium in the \((\delta_1, \delta_2)\)-ultimatum game in the general case is very laborious, because in this game, contrary to the ultimatum game, proposer does not find necessarily her maximum utility when responder accepts the offer, and it is necessary to compute payoffs when proposer wants her offer accepted or rejected. For instance, if \( \delta_1 \) is relatively large, then the punishment is low for proposer and she could prefer her offer be rejected.
the strategy $x_1 = D_{12}$ dominates the strategy of giving $x_1 > D_{12}$, because

$$u_1 (x_1) = M - x_1 - 2\lambda_1 (D_{12} - x_1) < M - x_1 < D_{11} \quad \forall x_1 > D_{12}.$$ 

Since dictator is not going to damage herself, the domain could be restricted to $x_1 \in [0, D_{12}]$, dictator’s utility can be written as

$$u_1 (x_1) = M - x_1 - 2\mu_1 (D_{12} - x_1) = M - 2\mu_1 D_{12} - x_1 (1 - 2\mu_1).$$

Therefore, the theoretical prediction for dictator game is

$$x^*_d (D_{12}) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \mu_1 < 1/2 \\ [0, D_{12}] & \text{if } \mu_1 = 1/2 \\ D_{12} & \text{if } \mu_1 > 1/2 \end{cases}.$$ 

Note that this prediction is the same as in FS when $D_{12} = M/2$.\textsuperscript{22}

### 4.2 Ultimatum Game

The strategy space of the proposer is $S_1 = [0, M]$, and the strategy space of responder is limited to a threshold space, where responder has to set the minimum accepted offer.\textsuperscript{23} In other words, responder chooses a threshold $x_2$ between 0 and $M$, such that, if $x_1 \geq x_2$, she will accept the offer and otherwise she will reject it. Therefore, with this assumption, the strategy space of both agents is the same, $S_1 = S_2 = [0, M]$.

For the sake of simplicity, we define for $i = 1, 2$

$$u_i^a (x_1) = u_i (x_1, x_2) \quad \text{if } x_1 \geq x_2,$$

$$u_i^r (x_1) = u_i (x_1, x_2) \quad \text{if } x_1 < x_2,$$

that represents agent $i$’s utility function when responder accepts ($u_i^a (x_1)$) and when responder rejects ($u_i^r (x_1)$) the offer $x_1$.

Given a strategy profile $(x_1, x_2) \in S_1 \times S_2$ the material payoffs are

$$p_1 (x_1, x_2) = \begin{cases} M - x_1 & \text{if } x_1 \geq x_2 \\ 0 & \text{if } x_1 < x_2 \end{cases},$$

and

$$p_2 (x_1, x_2) = \begin{cases} x_1 & \text{if } x_1 \geq x_2 \\ 0 & \text{if } x_1 < x_2 \end{cases}.$$ 

Therefore, the utility functions are written (3) as

$$u_i^a (x_1) = M - x_1 - 2\lambda_1 \max \{x_1 - D_{12}, 0\} - 2\mu_1 \max \{D_{12} - x_1, 0\},$$

$$u_i^r (x_1) = -\lambda_1 \max \{D_{11} - D_{12}, 0\} - \mu_1 \max \{D_{12} - D_{11}, 0\},$$

\textsuperscript{22}A nonlinear version of the model would give us solutions between 0 and $D_{12}$.

\textsuperscript{23}The strategy space of responder is an action for each information set, that is, for each $x_1 \in S_1$, responder has to decide if she accepts or rejects the offer. Hence, $S_2 : S_1 \to \{A, R\} = \{A, R\}^{[0, M]}$. 

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or in a compact form

\[ x_u^* (D_2) = \begin{cases} x_u^* & \text{if } \mu_1 < 1/2, \ D_2 < \frac{-\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} \ D_2, \\
\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 < 1/2, \ \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} \ D_2 < M < D_2 < M/2, \\
\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 < 1/2, \ D_2 > M/2, \\
\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 > 1/2 \end{cases} \]

or in a compact form

\[ x_u^* (D_2) = \begin{cases} \text{MAO}_u & \text{if } \mu_1 < \frac{1}{2} \\
\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 > \frac{1}{2} \end{cases} \]

where

\[ \text{MAO}_u = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \frac{2 (\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, 0 \right\}, \ \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \right\} \]

is the responder’s minimum accepted offer.

Note that \( x_u^* \) is a continuous function, except at \( \mu_1 = 1/2 \) (as in the dictator game). In any case, responder will accept the offer \( x_u^* \). When \( \mu_1 < 1/2 \), proposer exploits her bargaining power, but not totally. As it is observed in the figure 2A, the amount offered, \( x_u^* \), depends on \( D_2 \). When \( D_2 \in \left[ 0, \frac{-\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} \ D_2 \right] \), proposer offers nothing. The greater is the responder’s advantageous relative injustice aversion \( \mu_2 \), the greater has to be \( D_2 \), in order to force the proposer to offer a positive amount. Observe that if the advantageous relative injustice aversion for responder is large enough (\( \mu_2 > \frac{2D_2}{\lambda_2 M - 2D_2} \)), then responder

\[ u_2^*(x_1) = x_1 - 2\lambda_2 \ max \ \{ D_{21} - x_1, 0 \} - 2\mu_2 \ max \ \{ x_1 - D_{21}, 0 \}, \]

\[ u_2^*(x_1) = -\lambda_2 \ max \ \{ D_{22} - D_{21}, 0 \} - 2\mu_2 \ max \ \{ D_{21} - D_{22}, 0 \}. \]

Note that when \( D_{11} \) and \( D_{12} \) appears in the utility function of proposer, they stand for what proposer thinks she deserves (\( D_{11} \)) and what proposer thinks that responder deserves (\( D_{12} \)). However, when \( D_{21} \) and \( D_{22} \) appear in the utility function of responder, they stand for what responder thinks proposer deserves (\( D_{21} \)) and what responder thinks she deserves (\( D_{22} \)). In equilibrium, beliefs have to be consistent, then for the sake of simplicity, I will suppose that \( D_i \) is what agent \( i \) deserves. Hence, I restrict my attention to the cases where they are indeed consistent. Therefore, I set \( D_1 = D_{11} = D_{21} \) and \( D_2 = D_{12} = D_{22} \).

Let us find the SPNE by backward induction. Given a proposal \( x_1 = x_u^* \), responder has to choose whether to accept or reject the offer. The best-response of responder will be a function of \( M \) (the total amount), \( x_u^* \) (the proposal), \( D_2 \) (what she deserves) and the parameters that capture the relative injustice aversion \( \lambda_2 \) (disadvantageous) and \( \mu_2 \) (advantageous).

The optimal strategy for proposer is to offer (see Appendix for details)

\[ x_u^* (D_2) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \mu_1 < 1/2, \ D_2 < \frac{-\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} \ D_2, \\
\frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 < 1/2, \ \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} \ D_2 < M < D_2 < M/2, \\
\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M < D_2 < M/2 \end{cases} \]

or in a compact form

\[ x_u^* (D_2) = \begin{cases} \text{MAO}_u & \text{if } \mu_1 < \frac{1}{2} \\
\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M < D_2 < M/2 & \text{if } \mu_1 < \frac{1}{2} \\
\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M < D_2 < M/2 & \text{if } \mu_1 > \frac{1}{2} \end{cases} \]

\[ \text{MAO}_u = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \frac{2 (\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, 0 \right\}, \ \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \right\} \]
Figure 2: Optimal proposal $x_u^*$ and proposer’s bargaining power $BP_u$ for $\mu_2 = 1/4$ (solid line), $\mu_2 = 1/2$ (dashed line) and $\mu_2 = 1$ (dotted line). Fixed values $\mu_1 < 1/2$, $\lambda_2 = 1$.

does not have incentives to reject the offer, because a rejection will cause to her an advantageous inequality aversion (responder “loses” less than proposer) that is worse than the disadvantageous inequality aversion (responder would obtain less than she deserves) that it is produced when she accepts the offer. However, once a positive amount is offered, $D_2 \in \left(\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2+\mu_2)}, M, M/2\right)$, then $x_u^*$ is an increasing function of $D_2$ with slope $\frac{2(\lambda_2+\mu_2)}{1+2\lambda_2}$ that increases with $\mu_2$. If $D_2 > M/2$, then offer does not depend on $\mu_2$ (because advantageous relative injustice aversion is not possible), and its value $\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1+2\lambda_2}$ is an increasing function of $\lambda_2$.\footnote{If $\lambda_2$ is bounded above, $\lambda_2 \leq 1$, then $\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1+2\lambda_2} \leq \frac{M}{2}$. In any case $\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1+2\lambda_2} < \frac{M}{2}$, therefore, an offer of $x_1 = \frac{M}{2}$ should be always accepted by the responder.}

In words, the greater is the responder’s disadvantageous relative injustice aversion $\lambda_2$, the more likely is a responder’s rejection and therefore, proposer has to offer a greater amount $x_u^*$ in order to avoid the rejection.

It is noteworthy that since $\mu_2 \leq \lambda_2$, then $\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2+\mu_2)} \leq 1/4$, and therefore, if $D_2 > M/4$, then proposer will offer a positive proportion of the pie. Note also that the interval $\left(\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2+\mu_2)}, M, M/2\right)$, is not empty, except when if $\lambda_2 = 0$. In this case, since $\mu_2 \leq \lambda_2$, then $\mu_2 = \lambda_2 = 0$ and responder behaves like in the classical model, accepting any offer, i.e., $x_u^* = 0$.\footnote{If $\lambda_2$ is bounded above, $\lambda_2 \leq 1$, then $\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1+2\lambda_2} \leq \frac{M}{2}$. In any case $\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1+2\lambda_2} < \frac{M}{2}$, therefore, an offer of $x_1 = \frac{M}{2}$ should be always accepted by the responder.}
Proposer’s bargaining power can be defined for $\mu_1 < 1/2$ as\textsuperscript{27}

$$BP_u(D_2) = D_2 - x_u^* = \begin{cases} 
D_2 & \text{if } D_2 < \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M \\
\frac{(1-2\lambda_2)D_2 + \mu_2 M}{1+2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M < D_2 < \frac{M}{2} \\
\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M - \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M & \text{if } D_2 > \frac{M}{2}
\end{cases}.$$ 

Note that only when $D_2 \in \left(\frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)}M, \frac{M}{2}\right)$, $BP_u$ depends on $\mu_2$, and in this interval, the higher $\mu_2$, the greater is proposer’s bargaining power, given that responder is less likely to reject. However, the higher $\lambda_2$, the smaller proposer’s bargaining power. In figure 2B, the dependence of the bargaining power as a function of $D_2$ is shown.

### 4.3 (0, 1)-Ultimatum Game

In the (0, 1)-ultimatum game, the optimal proposer’s strategy is

$$x_{01}^* (D_2) = \max \left\{ 0, \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} \right\}$$

and the responder’s minimum accepted offer is

$$MAO_{01} = \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2}, 0 \right\}.$$ 

Note that, even in this game, although the proposer’s bargaining power has been greatly reduced, she can exploit partially her bargaining power when $\mu_1 < 1/2$, offering

$$x_{01}^* (D_2) = \max \left\{ 0, \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} \right\} = \max \left\{ 0, D_2 - \frac{\mu_2 (M - D_2)}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} \right\}$$

that is smaller that $D_2$. The bargaining power is defined as

$$BP_{01} (D_2) = D_2 - x_{01}^* = \begin{cases} 
D_2 & \text{if } D_2 < \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M \\
\frac{\mu_2 (M - D_2)}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } D_2 > \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M
\end{cases}.$$ 

As it is observed in figure 3B, $BP_{01} (D_2)$ is an increasing function with respect to $D_2$, until $D_2 < \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M$, and it is a decreasing function with respect to $D_2$, for $D_2 > \frac{\mu_2}{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} M$. In fact, when responder deserves the whole pie, then $x_{01}^* (M) = M$, i.e., proposer losses the bargaining power and proposer offers the total amount to responder. In the latter interval, proposer’s bargaining power is an increasing function with respect to responder’s disadvantageous relative injustice aversion ($\mu_2$) and a decreasing function of responder’s disadvantageous relative injustice aversion ($\lambda_2$). In this particular game, a rejection is relatively more unjust for proposer than for responder. If proposer does not like advantageous relative injustice aversion ($\mu_2$ high), then proposer has a higher bargaining power. On the other hand, if proposer does not like disadvantageous relative injustice aversion ($\lambda_2$ high), then she is more likely to reject and hence proposer loses bargaining power.

\textsuperscript{27}If $\mu_1 > \frac{1}{2}$, then $x_u^* = D_2$, and hence for convention $BP_u = 0$. 

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Figure 3: Optimal proposal $x^*$ and proposer’s bargaining power $BP_{01}$ for $\mu_2 = 1/4$ (solid line), $\mu_2 = 1/2$ (dashed line) and $\mu_2 = 1$ (dotted line). Fixed values $\mu_1 < 1/2$, $\lambda_2 = 1$.

4.4 Comparison of equilibria

In this section, the theoretical predictions of the dictator game, ultimatum game and (0, 1)-ultimatum game are compared. Observed differences will allow us to establish hypothesis about the behavior in the lab.

**Dictator Game vs Ultimatum Game**

The classical prediction for those games ($\mu_1 = \mu_2 = \lambda_2 = 0$) for proposer is to offer $x^* = 0$, in both games. This prediction holds in the dictator game when dictator’s advantageous relative injustice aversion is relatively small ($\mu_1 < 1/2$). However in the ultimatum game, proposer cannot exploit all her bargaining power, because according to responder’s parameters $\mu_2$ and $\lambda_2$, she could reject the offer. In any case, if proposer’s advantageous relative injustice aversion is relatively large ($\mu_1 > 1/2$), either in dictator game or ultimatum game, proposers do not want to exploit her bargaining power and she offers $x^* = D_2$.

When $\mu_1 < 1/2$, then $x^*_u = 0$, and the excess of proposer’s bargaining power in the dictator game with respect to the ultimatum game is computed as

$$BP_d - BP_u = (D_2 - x^*_d) - (D_2 - x^*_u) = x^*_u \geq 0.$$ 

Therefore, when proposer’s advantageous relative injustice aversion is relatively small ($\mu_1 < 1/2$), then the current model predicts a greater offer in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game.

**Ultimatum Game vs (0, 1)-Ultimatum Game**
Proposers
The classical prediction for ultimatum game ($\mu_1 = 0$) for proposer is to offer $x_u^* = 0$. However, for the $(0,1)$-ultimatum game, it is found multiple equilibria.

Our predictions with the relative injustice aversion utility function are

$$x_u^* = \begin{cases} 
  \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \right\}, \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \right\} & \text{if } \mu_1 < \frac{1}{2} \\
  \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 > \frac{1}{2}
\end{cases},$$

for the ultimatum game and

$$x_{01}^* = \begin{cases} 
  \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} \right\} & \text{if } \mu_1 < \frac{1}{2} \\
  \frac{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 > \frac{1}{2}
\end{cases},$$

for the $(0,1)$UG.

Let us suppose that $2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 > \mu_2 M$, because otherwise, $x_u^* = x_{01}^* = 0$. If proposer’s advantageous relative injustice aversion is relatively large ($\mu_1 > 1/2$), then proposer does not want to exploit her bargaining power and the prediction in both games is the same ($x_u^* = x_{01}^* = D_2$). However, if $\mu_1 < 1/2$, since $\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2 < 1 + 2\lambda_2$, then, if $2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 > \mu_2 M$, it is satisfied

$$\frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} < \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2},$$

and therefore

$$x_u^* = \min \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \right\} < \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} = x_{01}^*. $$

Hence, when proposer’s advantageous relative injustice aversion is relatively small ($\mu_1 < 1/2$), the current model forecasts that proposer offers a greater amount in the $(0,1)$UG than in the ultimatum game.

I compute the excess of proposer’s bargaining power in the ultimatum game with respect to the $(0,1)$UG as $BP_u - BP_{01}$. For $D_2 \leq M/2$, the bargaining power in the ultimatum game is greater than in the $(0,1)$UG if and only if $\mu_2 \leq 1$.

$$BP_u - BP_{01} = (1 - \mu_2) \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{(\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2)(1 + 2\lambda_2)} > 0.$$ 

When $D_2 \leq M/2$, differences of bargaining power between the ultimatum game and the $(0,1)$UG goes to zero when $\mu_2$ increases from 0 to 1.

For $D_2 \geq M/2$, $x_u^* = \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}$, and $BP_u = D_2 - \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}$, and therefore

$$BP_u - BP_{01} = \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} - \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} = \frac{(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)(2D_2 - M)}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} > 0.$$ 

If responder’s advantageous relative injustice aversion is greater than 1 ($\mu_2 > 1$), it is possible to find offers such that the responder would reject in the ultimatum game, but not in the $(0,1)$UG. It suggests that $\mu_2$ should be bounded above by 1.
Responders

The classical prediction for ultimatum game ($\mu_1 = 0$) for responders, is that the minimum accepted offer is $MAO_u = 0$. However, for the $(0,1)UG$, any minimum accepted offer can be part of the equilibria. In the current model, if $\mu_2 \leq 1$, then $\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2 \leq 1 + 2\lambda_2$, and then

$$\frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{\mu_2 + 2\lambda_2} \geq \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2) D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}$$

and therefore $MAO_{01} \geq MAO_u$.

5 Conclusions

I present a utility function model with the same philosophy than the inequality aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1999], that is able to explain rejections in non-zero-sum games with production. The relative injustice aversion utility function represents the same preferences than FS when game is a zero-sum game, and the justice principle followed is the egalitarian principle (the unique justice principle when there is not production).

The problem of explaining rejections in the dictator game with production was solved by Frohlich et al. [2004] defining different types of justices. However, the problem for non-zero-sum games was not solved when the deserved point is not the half of the pie, because rejections could reduce inequality and relative injustice, but it never reduces absolute injustice.

Relative injustice aversion model could have defined with different justice principles as Frohlich et al. [2004], nevertheless, the current model only considers a single focal point following the idea of Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido [2012a] that claim that justice is not genuine but context dependent, and therefore, it is enough to define a single justice point that could change with the framework. In any case, rejections in the ultimatum game are forecasted.

This paper also presents a modified ultimatum game, call $(0,1)$-Ultimatum Game, where responder does not have rejection cost. Theoretical prediction forecast that, under certain conditions, proposers offer a greater proportion in the latter bargaining game than in the classical ultimatum game and in the ultimatum game the proportion offered is greater than in the dictator game. Besides, the minimum accepted offer is greater in the ultimatum game that in the $(0,1)UG$. These results are consistent with intuition and they will be contrasted experimentally in future research.

References


6 Appendix

6.1 Ultimatum Game

It is assumed that $D_{11} = D_{21} = D_1$ and $D_{12} = D_{22} = D_2$, and agents’ rationality, then $D_1 + D_2 = M$, therefore the utility functions can be written as a function of $D_2$

\[
\begin{align*}
    u^a_1 (x_1) &= M - x_1 - 2 \lambda_1 \max \{x_1 - D_2, 0\} - 2 \mu_1 \max \{D_2 - x_1, 0\}, \\
    u^r_1 (x_1) &= -2 \lambda_1 \max \{M/2 - D_2, 0\} - 2 \mu_1 \max \{D_2 - M/2, 0\}, \\
    u^a_2 (x_1) &= x_1 - 2 \lambda_2 \max \{D_2 - x_1, 0\} - 2 \mu_2 \max \{x_1 - D_2, 0\}, \\
    u^r_2 (x_1) &= -2 \lambda_2 \max \{D_2 - M/2, 0\} - 2 \mu_2 \max \{M/2 - D_2, 0\}.
\end{align*}
\]
Responder’s strategy
When responder accepts the offer, what determines the envy/guilty feeling is whether $D_2$ is greater or smaller than $x_1$. Contrary, if she rejects the offer, what determines the envy/guilty feeling is whether $2D_2 - M$ is greater or smaller than zero.

SPNE are studied using backward induction. Four possible cases are studied, denoted as $(A, R)$, where $A, R \in \{\lambda, \mu\}$. The four cases are summarized as $(A, R)$, where

$$A = \begin{cases} \lambda & \text{if } x^* < D_2 \\ \mu & \text{if } x^* > D_2 \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad R = \begin{cases} \lambda & \text{if } M/2 < D_2 \\ \mu & \text{if } M/2 > D_2 \end{cases}$$

where $\lambda$ stands for envy and $\mu$ stands for guilty.

**Case 1:** $(\mu, \mu)$. Responder deserves less than the half of the pie ($M/2 > D_2$) and the offer is greater than what she deserves ($x^* > D_2$). She will feel guilty in any case, whether she accepts or if she rejects the offer.

If she accepts, her utility is $u_2^\mu(x^*) = x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2)$, and if she refuses, her utility is $u_2^\mu(x^*) = -\mu_2(M - 2D_2)$. She will accept the offer if $x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2) > -\mu_2(M - 2D_2)$, but the latter equation is true because it is equivalent to $x^*(1 - \mu_2) + \mu_2(M - x^*) > 0$.

**Case 2:** $(\mu, \lambda)$. The offer is greater than what responder deserves but it is smaller than the half of the pie ($D_2 < x^* < M/2$). She will feel guilty if she accepts the offer ($D_2 < x^*$) and she will feel envy if she refuses the offer ($D_2 < M/2$). If responder accepts, her utility is $u_2^\mu(x^*) = x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2)$ and if she rejects the offer, her utility is $u_2^\mu(x^*) = -\lambda_2(2D_2 - M)$.

She will accept if $x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2) > -\lambda_2(2D_2 - M)$, that is equivalent to $x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2) + \lambda_2(2D_2 - M) > 0$, that is true because by assumption $2D_2 - M > 0$, and then $x^* < 2D_2$. Therefore, $x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2) + \lambda_2(2D_2 - M) > x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2) = x^* - 2\mu_2x^* + 2\mu_2D_2 > x^* - 2\mu_2x^* + \mu_2x^* = (1 - \mu_2)x^* > 0$.

Cases 1 and 2 can be summed up as the fact that responder will accept any offer such that $x^* \geq D_2$.

**Case 3:** $(\lambda, \mu)$. The offer is smaller than what responder deserves but it is greater than the half of the pie ($M/2 < x^* < D_2$). She will feel envy if she accepts the offer ($x^* < D_2$) and she will feel guilty if she refuses the offer ($M/2 > D_2$). If she accepts, her utility is $u_2^\lambda(x^*) = x^* - \lambda_2(2D_2 - 2x^*)$, and if she rejects the offer, her utility is $u_2^\lambda(x^*) = -\mu_2(M - 2D_2)$. She will accept if $x^* - \lambda_2(2D_2 - 2x^*) \geq -\mu_2(M - 2D_2)$, that is, when $x^* \geq \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}$. We call $MAO_3 = \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, 0 \right\}$.

**Case 4:** $(\lambda, \lambda)$. Responder responds more than the half of the pie ($D_2 > M/2$) and the offer is smaller than what she deserves ($D_2 > x^*$). She will feel envy in any case, whether she accepts or if she rejects the offer. If she accepts, her utility is $u_2^\lambda(x^*) = x^* - \lambda_2(2D_2 - 2x^*)$.

$^{29}$MAO$_3$ is the minimum accepted offer in case 3. Note that $\frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} < D_2$, and therefore an offer of $x^* = D_2$ is always accepted. However, an offer of $x^* = 0$, is accepted if and only if $D_2 < \frac{\mu_2 M}{\pi(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)}$. Since $\lambda_2 \geq \mu_2$, then $\frac{\mu_2 M}{\pi(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)} \in [0, M/4]$, then, if $D_2 > M/4$, then responder will reject a null offer.
and if she rejects the offer, her utility is \( u_2^r(x^*) = -\lambda_2(2D_2 - M) \). She will accept the offer if \( x^* \geq \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \). We call \( MAO_4 = \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \).  

Responders strategy can be summarized as follows. If \( x^* \geq D_2 \), then responder accepts, otherwise, when \( x^* < D_2 \), if \( D_2 < M/2 \), responder will accept if \( x^* \geq \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, 0 \right\} \), however, if \( D_2 > M/2 \), then responder will accept if \( x^* \geq \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \).

**Proposers strategy**

If responder accepts the offer, proposers utility is

\[
u_1^p(x^*) = M - x^* - \lambda_1 \max \{2x^* - 2D_2, 0\} - \mu_1 \max \{2D_2 - 2x^*, 0\},
\]

and if responder rejects the offer

\[
u_1^p(x^*) = -\lambda_1 \max \{M - 2D_2, 0\} - \mu_1 \max \{2D_2 - M, 0\}.
\]

The strategy of proposer will be to offer \( x^* \) such that responder accepts, because an offer of \( D_2 \) strongly dominates any other offer \( x_r \), such that \( x_r \) will be rejected by responder, because \( u_1^q(D_2) = M - D_2 = D_1 \geq 0 \), and \( u_1^q(x_r) < 0 \). If \( D_2 \) would be unknown by proposer, then the acceptance can be assured by offering \( x^* = M/2 \) (see cases 3 and 4 of responder’s strategy), because \( u_1^q(M/2) > u_1^q(x_r) \). The aim of proposer is to consider if she can offer an amount \( x^* < \min \{D_2, M/2\} \) that will be accepted by responder and in this way to exploit her bargaining power. Thus, only cases 3 and 4 of strategy of responder are considered.

If \( D_2 < M/2 \) (case 3), then responder will accept if \( x^* \in [MAO_3, D_2] \) and she will reject if \( x^* \in [0, MAO_3] \). Let us compute the critical points in the interior of the interval \( x_1 \in [MAO_3, D_2] \) (when responder accepts). Since \( u_1^q(x_1) = M - x_1 - 2\mu_1(D_2 - x_1) \), then \( \frac{\text{d}u_1^q}{\text{d}x_1}(x_1) = -1 + 2\mu_1 \). Hence, if \( \mu_1 > 1/2 \) then \( \frac{\text{d}u_1^q}{\text{d}x_1}(x_1) > 0 \) and \( x^* = D_2 \). However, if \( \mu_1 < 1/2 \) then \( \frac{\text{d}u_1^q}{\text{d}x_1}(x_1) < 0 \) and \( x^* = MAO_3 \).

If \( D_2 > M/2 \) (case 4), then responder will accept if \( x^* \in [MAO_4, D_2] \) and she will reject if \( x^* \in [0, MAO_4] \). Since \( u_1^q(x^*) = M - x^* - 2\lambda_1(x^* - D_2) \), then \( \frac{\text{d}u_1^q}{\text{d}x_1}(x_1) = -1 - 2\lambda_1 < 0 \), and therefore, proposer will offer the possible minimum in the interval \( [MAO_4, D_2] \), i.e., \( x^* = MAO_4 \).

Note that in case 3, \( D_2 < M/2 \) and therefore \( MAO_3 < MAO_4 \); and in case 4, \( D_2 > M/2 \) and therefore \( MAO_4 > MAO_4 \). Therefore, the minimum acceptable offer by responder can be written as \( x^* = \min \{MAO_3, MAO_4\} \).

**Equilibrium**

The optimal strategy for proposer is to offer

\[
x^* = \begin{cases} 
\min \left\{ \frac{\max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, 0 \right\}}{D_2} \cdot \frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \right\} & \text{if } \mu_1 < 1/2 \\
\frac{\lambda_2 M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} & \text{if } \mu_1 > 1/2 
\end{cases}
\]
The optimal strategy for responder is to accept any
\[ x^* \geq \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2M}{1 + 2\lambda_2}, 0 \right\}, \frac{\lambda_2M}{1 + 2\lambda_2} \right\}, \]
and reject any another offer.

### 6.2 (0, 1)-Ultimatum Game

With the same assumptions than in the ultimatum game, the utility function of proposer and responder is written as a function of \( D \)

- \( u^q_1(x_1) = M - x_1 - 2\lambda_1 \max \{x_1 - D_2, 0\} - 2\mu_1 \max \{D_2 - x_1, 0\} \),
- \( u^q_1(x_1) = -\lambda_1 \max \{M - 2D_2 + x_1, 0\} - \mu_1 \max \{2D_2 - M - x_1, 0\} \),
- \( u^q_2(x_1) = x_1 - 2\lambda_2 \max \{D_2 - x_1, 0\} - 2\mu_2 \max \{x_1 - D_2, 0\} \),
- \( u^q_2(x_1) = x_1 - \lambda_2 \max \{2D_2 - M - x_1, 0\} - \mu_2 \max \{M - 2D_2 + x_1, 0\} \).

SPNE are studied using backward induction with the same four cases than in the ultimatum game depending if responder feels *envy* or *guilty* when she accepts or rejects the offer.

**Responder’s decision**

If responder accepts the offer, what determines the *envy/guilty* feeling is whether \( D_2 \) is greater or smaller than \( x_1 \). Contrary, if she rejects the offer, what determines the *envy/guilty* feeling is whether \( 2D_2 - M - x_1 \) is greater or smaller than zero, that is equivalent to the fact that \( x_1 \) is greater or smaller than \( 2D_2 - M \).

**Case 1: \((\mu, \mu)\).** \( x^* \geq D_2 \) and \( x^* \geq 2D_2 - M \). Responder will have *envy* in any case. If she accepts, her utility is \( u^q_2(x^*) = x^* - 2\mu_2(x^* - D_2) \), and if she rejects the offer, her utility is \( u^q_2(x^*) = x^* - \mu_2(x^* + M - 2D_2) \). She will accept because \( u^q_2(x^*) \geq u^q_2(x^*) \) is equivalent to \( x^* \leq M \).

**Case 2: \((\mu, \lambda)\).** \( x^* \geq D_2 \) and \( x^* \leq 2D_2 - M \). Responder will feel *guilty* if she accepts the offer, because \( x^* \) is greater than she deserves. However, she will feel *envy* if she refuses the offer. Assumptions implies that \( x^* = D_2 = M \), and in this case, responder is indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer, because \( u^q_2(D_2) = D_2 \) and \( u^q_2(D_2) = D_2 - \lambda_2(D_2 - M) = D_2 \).

**Case 3: \((\lambda, \mu)\).** \( x^* \leq D_2 \) and \( x^* \geq 2D_2 - M \). Responder will feel *envy* if she accepts the offer, because \( x^* \) is smaller than she deserves. However, she will feel *guilty* if she refuses the offer. If she accepts, her utility is \( u^q_2(x^*) = x^* - 2\lambda_2(D_2 - x^*) \), and if she rejects the offer, her utility is \( u^q_2(x^*) = x^* - \mu_2(x^* + M - 2D_2) \). Thus, she will accept the offer if and only if \( x^* \geq \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2M}{2\lambda_2 + \mu_2} \). We call \( MAO_3 = \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2M}{2\lambda_2 + \mu_2}, 0 \right\} \).

\(^{31}\text{Note that } MAO_3 < D_2 \text{, and therefore, an offer of } x^* = D_2 \text{ is always accepted. However, the responder would be willing to accept an offer below } D_2 \text{ if a rejection would cause a excessive damage to the proposer, causing the responder a great advantageous relative injustice (guilt).} \)
Case 4: \((\lambda, \lambda)\). \(x^* \leq D_2\) and \(x^* \leq 2D_2 - M\). She will feel envy in any case. If she accepts, her utility is \(u_3^\mu(x^*) = x^* - 2\lambda_2(D_2 - x^*)\), and if she rejects the offer, her utility is \(u_2^\mu(x^*) = x^* - \lambda_2(2D_2 - M - x^*)\). Thus, she will only accept the offer if \(x^* \geq M\).

Cases 1 to 4 can be summarized as follow: If \(x^* \geq D_2\), then responder accepts, otherwise, if \(x^* < D_2\), responder will accept if \(x^* \geq \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{2\lambda_2 + \mu_2}, 0 \right\}\).

Since \(\frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{2\lambda_2 + \mu_2} \leq D_2\), then, responder’s strategy is summed up to accept any offer \(x^* \geq MAO_3\).

Proposer’s decision

From the point of view of proposer she has to chose \(x^*\) such that maximizes her payoff. If proposer offers \(x^* = D_2\), then responder will accept and the proposer’s payoff is \(u_1^\mu(D_2) = (M - D_2) = D_1\). If proposer offer \(x^* > D_2\), responder will accept and proposer’s utility is \(u_1^\mu(x^*) = M - x^* - 2\lambda_1(x_1 - D_2) < M - x^* < M - D_2 = D_1\). The strategy of offering \(x^* > D_2\) is dominated by \(x^* = D_2\), and the strategy of offering \(x^* < MAO_3\) is also dominated by \(x_1 = D_2\). We only need to study the utility function \(u_1^\mu(x_1)\) in the interval \([MAO_3, D_2]\). Since \(u_1^\mu(x_1) = M - x_1 - 2\mu_1(D_2 - x_1)\) \(\forall x_1 \in [MAO_3, D_2]\), its derivative with respect to \(x_1\), is \(\frac{du_1^\mu}{dx_1}(x_1) = -1 + 2\mu_1\), and therefore, if \(\mu_1 > 1/2\) then \(x^* = D_2\) and if \(\mu_1 < 1/2\), then \(x^* = MAO_3\).

Equilibrium

The best strategy for proposer is to offer \(x_{0,1}^*\), such that, if \(\mu_1 > 1/2\), then \(x_{0,1}^* = D_2\) and if \(\mu_1 < 1/2\), then \(x_{0,1}^* = MAO_3\), and the minimum amount that responder is willing to accepts is \(MAO_3 = \max \left\{ \frac{2(\lambda_2 + \mu_2)D_2 - \mu_2 M}{2\lambda_2 + \mu_2}, 0 \right\}\).

---

\(^{32}\)Like in case 2, the only case where the responder could accept the offer is when \(x^* = D_2 = M\). In the \((0, 1)\)-ultimatum game, responder never suffers from disadvantageous relative injustice aversion (envy) when she rejects an offer.

\(^{33}\)Then, \(x^* \geq 2D_2 - M\) is assumed, because otherwise \(x^* = D_2 = M\).

\(^{34}\)If proposer offers \(x^* < MAO_3\), responder rejects the offer and hence proposer’s utility is negative \(u_1^\mu(x_1) = -\lambda_1 \max \{M - 2D_2 + x_1, 0\} - \mu_1 \max \{2D_2 - M - x_1, 0\} < 0\) \(\forall x_1 \in [0, MAO_3]\).